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Speed limits are a well-known instrument to improve traffic safety. However, speed limits 
alone are not enough; there is need for enforcement of these limits. When one observes fine 
structures for speed offences one often finds two characteristics. First, the fine increases with 
the severity of the violation. Secondly, the fine depends on the speeders’ offence history. We 
focus on this last point and confront two fine structures, both increasing with speed: a uniform 
fine and a differentiated fine, which depends on the offence history. Drivers differ in their 
propensity to have an accident and hence in their expected accident costs. Literature then 
prescribes that the fine for bad drivers should be higher than for good drivers. However, the 
government does not know the type of the driver. We develop a model where the number of 
previous convictions gives information on the type of the driver. We find that the optimal fine 
structure depends on the probability of detection and on the strength of the relationship 
between the type and having a record. We illustrate this by means of a numerical example. 
                                                 
1 I would like to acknowledge the financial support of the Belgian Federal Science Policy research program – 
Indicators for sustainable development – contract CP/01/38 (Economic Analysis of Traffic Safety: Theory and 
Applications). I thank S. Rousseau for the useful comments and C. Billiet for the advice on the legal system.  
1  INTRODUCTION 
Since speed plays an important role in most accidents
1, speed limits are an important 
instrument for the government to improve road safety.  
However, the imposition of speed limits alone is not enough; they have to be supplemented 
with enforcement
2. Enforcement, typically, consists of two elements: the probability of 
detection and the magnitude of the fine. If the goal is to maximise social welfare, the 
probability of detection and the fine should
3 be such that  
 
expected damage due to speeding
probability of detection
= fine  (1) 
The faster you drive, the higher the expected damage and hence, for a given probability of 
detection, the higher the fine should be. This coincides with reality since in all European 
countries the fine is increasing in the level of speeding
4.  
In reality
5 we also see that the fines increase in the number of previous convictions. The 
goal of this paper is to find a rational for this observation. At first glance, it seems that the 
analysis of optimal fines for repeated offences would not differ from the analysis of a single 
offence. If the fine is set optimally with respect to the first offence, and the harm caused by 
the second offence is the same, there is no apparent reason to set the fine differently for a 
second offence
6. There are, nonetheless, three reasons why it might be desirable to condition 
fines on the offence history
7.  
Firstly, the use of the offence history may provide an additional incentive not to violate 
the law when detection not only leads to an immediate sanction, but also increases the 
sanction for future violations. Landsberger and Meilijson (1982) have been the first to analyze 
how prior offences should affect the expected fine. They have focused on the probability of 
detection rather than the level of punishment and have shown that given a fixed enforcement 
budget, a higher level of deterrence can be achieved by targeting potential violators based on 
past compliance rather than by treating everyone equal. This is feasible for environmental 
violations and tax evasion but in traffic it is difficult to control one particular party more than 
another. When the inspection frequency cannot be differentiated, it might be a logical idea, 
                                                 
1 For an overview of the literature on speed and its relationship with traffic accidents we refer to Aarts ea. 
(forthcoming) 
2 The literature on optimal enforcement of regulation started with the seminal papers by Becker (1968) and 
Stigler (1970). Polinsky and Shavell (2000) provide a very comprehensive overview.  
3 Polinsky and Shavell (2000) 
4 European Commission (2004).   
5 European Commission (2004) 
6 Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991) 
7 The first two are also stated in Polinsky and Shavell (2000)  
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which is also observed in reality, is to make the fines higher for repeated infractions. 
However, the literature on this is ambiguous. Harrington (1988) has found increasing fines for 
environmental violations, but he did not minimise the control costs for a given total pollution 
reduction. Firms with identical pollution cost functions end up polluting at different levels. If 
one takes these costs into account, Harford and Harrington (1991) have argued that a static 
solution, where all firms are treated alike, will often be superior to a state-dependent solution. 
Emons (2003), on the other hand, states that given that people’s wealth is fixed, the optimal 
fining scheme is decreasing rather than increasing in the number of past violations.  
Secondly, the offence history may provide information on the characteristics of 
individuals and the need to deter them. Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991) could explain 
increasing fines by assuming that people receive an acceptable as well as an illicit gain from 
the criminal activity. In a traffic situation, the acceptable gain of speeding could be the gain in 
time; unacceptable could be the thrill that joy riders experience of driving too fast.  
Thirdly, the traditional Becker result (1968) states that, with costly detection and costless 
fines, the fine should be set as high as possible. However, there are limits on the magnitude of 
the imposed sanctions. For example, the maximum amount that people can pay or the 
maximum amount that is politically and/or socially acceptable. If enforcement is imperfect, 
the Becker result leads to higher fines for repeated offenders if the upper limit is determined 
by the politically and/or socially acceptability and if people accept higher fines for repeated 
offenders. This makes that the expected fine increases, which on its turn increases compliance 
at no additional cost. 
In this contribution we explore the second reason and state that a positive relationship 
between previous convictions and the probability of being involved in an accident may 
rationalize increasing fines. Drivers differ among others in their skills and risk taking 
behaviour. This implies that drivers differ in two aspects: Their propensity to have an accident 
and their ability to comply with the regulation. In other words, for the same level of speed, the 
probability of being involved in an accident is higher for a ‘bad’ driver than for a ‘good’ 
driver. Moreover, even if a bad driver decides that he wants to comply, there is a probability 
that he will speed ‘by accident’. This makes that bad drivers have, for the same speed, higher 
expected accident costs, and given the structure of the optimal fine (equation (1)), should be 
fined more severely. 
The government does not know who the bad drivers are, but previous accidents and 
speeding violations may act as a ‘signal’ for being a bad driver. The literature on the 
relationship between previous convictions and the probability of being involved in an accident  
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typically finds a positive relationship. Gebers (1990) has stated that the number of previous 
traffic convictions (speeding, not stopping, no seatbelt) is one of the best single predictors of 
accident risk. Boyer et al. (1991) have found that the number of accidents is an increasing 
function of the number of previous offences. Stradling et al. (2000) argue that the kind of 
drivers recently caught for speeding are 59 per cent more likely to have also been recently 
involved in a car accident. Dagneault et al. (2002) focus on the relationship between previous 
convictions and the risk of subsequent accidents for drivers older than 65 years. They also 
find that convictions can predict the probability of an accident but state that prior accidents 
are a better predictor than prior convictions. Gebers and Peck (2003) again show that 
increased accident involvement is associated (among others) with increased prior traffic 
citation frequency and increased prior accident frequency. They state that traffic conviction 
frequency reflects risk-taking, social nonconformity and exposure.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: we first develop our model and 
calculate the private and socially optimal speed. Next, we calculate the speed limit. Then, we 
confront two fine structures, a uniform and a differentiated, and determine which structure 
performs best. We illustrate our model for interurban roads.  
 
2  MODEL 
We start with some notation. Next, we derive the socially and privately optimal level of speed 
and the optimal speed limit. Subsequently, we focus on the enforcement of this speed limit. 
As is common in the literature we assume that the speed limit and the fines are chosen 
independently. We derive the expressions for the uniform fine and the differentiated fines. 
Finally, we look at the influence of these fines on the chosen speed and calculate the welfare 
losses in order to compare the two systems. 
 
2.1 Notation 
For the individual driver the private cost of his trip  () Cx depends on the speed  x.  () Cx 
consists of the resource cost, the fuel cost and the time cost. We assume that this cost function 
is convex,  0 xx C ≥ . If speed increases, the private cost first decreases and then increases. 
Indeed if speed rises, the time needed to complete a certain trip decreases and hence the time 
costs decrease. This may also be interpreted more broadly. People may simply value fast 
driving positively, not for the time gain, but for the thrill and the excitement of it. On the  
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other hand, the fuel costs increase if speed increases. For low to intermediate speeds, the gain 
in time dominates; for high speeds, the fuel costs dominate. 
We consider unilateral accidents, this is, accidents in which only one party, the injurer, 
influences the probability of the accidents and the other party, the victim, bears all the losses. 
Think for example of an accident between a car driver and a cyclist
8. In the remainder of the 
text we use ‘car driver’ for the injurer and ‘cyclist’ for the victim. We distinguish two types of 
drivers, good and bad ones, which differ in their ability to comply with the regulation and in 
their expected accident costs. The probability of an accident  (, ) i pxθ  depends on the level of 
speed,  x and on the individual propensity to have an accident  i θ . People are either good, 
i g θ = , or bad drivers,  i b θ = . For a given level of speed, the probability of being involved in 
an accident is higher for bad drivers than for good drivers,    (,) (, ) p xb pxg x >∀   . For a given 
type  i θ , the probability of an accident is increasing in the level of speed,  0 (, ) xi px θ >  
( 0 (, ) xx i px θ ≥ ). If an accident happens, the victim incurs harm h . Drivers also differ in their 
ability to comply with regulation. A good driver who wants to comply will comply. We 
assume that bad drivers who want to comply can still speed by accident. If bad drivers 
unintentionally speed, they drive at speed  0
ao
b xx , εε = +> , where 
o x  is the intended speed. 
The probability of speeding by accident is denoted by  { } 01 q, ∈ . We assume that all drivers 
think that they are good drivers
9. Hence, bad drivers make decisions as if they are good 
drivers. For example, they do not take into account that they can speed by accident. There are 
γ  good drivers and () 1 γ −  bad drivers
10. The government only knows this distribution but 
not the individual driver types. We further assume that drivers are risk neutral.  
 
2.2 Private and Social Optimum 
When the government does not intervene, the car driver only takes his private costs into 
account and increases his speed until 
  0 min ( ) '( )
x Cx C x ⇒=  (2) 
His private optimal level of speed 
private x  is determined by the point where his marginal cost 
of increasing his speed by one km/hour does not provide a net benefit anymore. 
                                                 
8 Of course in reality the cyclist also influences the probability of an accident and the driver can also have losses. 
Note that the qualitative results will not change if we include private accident losses into the private costs  () Cx. 
9 This is not a very strong assumption. In general people overestimate their abilities. Svensson (1981) showed 
that 80% of the drivers think that they are above average drivers. 
10 γ  is exogenously given with 01 γ << . We normalise the population to one.  
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The social optimum
11 on the other hand takes into account the expected accident costs and is 
determined by  
  m i n( ) ( ,) ' ( ) ( ,) x ii x Cx px h C x p x h θ θ +⇒ = − (3) 
The socially optimal level of speed  *
i xθ  is determined by the point where the marginal cost 
of lowering the speed equals the marginal social utility of lowering the speed, which equals 
the decrease in expected social accident costs. Without government intervention, car drivers 
do not take the full costs of driving into account and drive too fast. We show this in Figure 1. 
On the horizontal axis we represent the level of speed, on the vertical axis the costs in euro. 
The upward sloping curve represents the marginal private cost reductions of driving faster 
'( ) Cx . The downward sloping lines are the negative of the marginal accident cost for the 
good and the bad driver,  (, ) x p xh θ − . The private optimal level of speed is given by the 
intersection of the marginal cost with the horizontal axis. The socially optimal speed levels 
are given by the intersections of the marginal cost with the marginal accident costs. It is clear 
from this figure that  ** private
g b xxx << . The government can bring the private optimal speed 
closer to the socially optimal level by the use of liability rules, infrastructure, vehicle 




Figure 1 : Private and social optimal level of speed 
 
                                                 
11 Note that we do not take into account the environmental and noise costs in determining the socially optimal 
speed. Rietveld ea (1998) calculate the socially optimal speed taking into account the private costs, the accident 
costs, the environmental costs, etc. 




'( ) Cx  
(, ) x p xgh −  
(,) x p xbh −  
* s  
*
b x   private x  
*
g x   
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2.3 Speed limit 
The government influences the drivers’ choice of speed by setting a speed limit. Because of 
the differences in accident propensity, it would be optimal to set a different speed limit for 
each type. However, the regulator lacks the information to do this and, for this reason, sets a 
uniform standard. This is also what we observe in the real world.  
The speed limit is denoted by s. The regulator minimises the expected social costs, taking 
into account the distribution of drivers’ types and the probability q with which bad drivers 












Cx pxgh pxbh q px bh





+ +− +− +
⇒= − − − − − +
min ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )
'( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )
 (4) 
This gives  * s  the optimal uniform speed limit with  ** * g b x sx ≤ ≤ .  * s  is lower than if bad 
drivers would be able to comply ( ) 0 q = . In Figure 1,  * s  is represented by the dotted line. The 
uniform speed limit makes that bad drivers drive faster than optimal, while good drivers drive 
too slow. The grey areas in Figure 1 represent the welfare losses under perfect compliance 
compared to the social optimum. For the proportion q of bad drivers that do not comply, 
there is an additional welfare loss equal to the arched trapezium.  
However, if there is no enforcement and given that  *
private sx < , no driver will have an 
incentive to comply and they will all drive at their private optimal speed. Therefore we need 
to discuss enforcement. 
 
2.4 Enforcement 
The government uses a fine  () x ϕ  and a probability of detection δ  to enforce the speed limit. 
In this paper we assume that the probability of detection is given and fixed. Even though the 
probability of detection does not depend on the level of speed, the fine does.  
We consider two cases. In the first case, the government sets a uniform fine. In the second 
case, the information imbedded in the offence history is used. This makes the fine dependent 
on the offence history.  
 
(a) Uniform fine 
A uniform fine only depends on the level of speed and not on the drivers’ type. The fine is 





















The government determines the optimal fine by setting the private cost of driving at a 





i Cx x Cx px h
x pxgh q pxbh q px bh
p xgh qpxbh q px bh
x
δϕ θ




  += + Ε
⇒= + − − + − +
+− − +− +
⇒=
*
() () () (, )
() (,) ( ) (,) ( ) ( ,)
(, ) ( ) (,) ( ) ( ,)
()
 (6) 
The fine thus equals the expected social cost of speeding, corrected for the probability of 
detection. Given this fine, the driver can choose whether to speed or not. He will not speed if 
the cost of speeding, taking into account the expected fine, is larger than the cost of driving at 
the speed limit. Hence if he does not speed, he will drive at the speed limit and  0 () x ϕ = . He 
will not drive slower than the speed limit because  *
private sx < . If he speeds, the problem for 
the driver becomes, using (6), 
 
x Cx x C x x δϕδ ϕ + ⇒= −
* min ( ) ( ) '( ) '( ) (7) 
This fine makes that the driver wants
13 to drive at the speed limit s*. However, q percent of 
the bad drivers will speed by accident and drive at speed  0
a
b xs *, εε = +> . Given that all 
drivers think that they are good drivers, they will not take this into account when choosing 
their level of speed.  
We show this in Figure 2. The ‘fat line’ gives the negative first derivative of the expected 
fine. People choose the speed where the first derivative of the private costs, which is the 
marginal benefit of speed, equals the marginal accident cost, which is the expected fine. This 
happens at  * s . Hence good drivers drive slower than socially optimal and bad drivers drive 
faster. q percent of the bad drivers will drive at speed 
a
b x s* > . The social welfare loss for a 
good driver ( ) g WL  equals the black triangle in Figure 2. They have to drive at a speed where 
the marginal benefit of increasing ones’ speed – the private cost- is higher than the marginal 
costs – the accident costs. The grey triangle represents the social welfare loss for a bad driver 
who complies( ) b WL . They drive at a speed where the marginal benefit of speed is lower than 
the marginal costs. The welfare loss for a bad driver who fails to comply equals the grey 
                                                 
13 Insert (6) in (7) and compare with (4)  
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triangle, ( ) b WL , plus the hatched trapezium,( )
a
b WL . Total social welfare loss of a uniform fine 
( ) uf WL  then equals  
 








g uf b b
g b
















Figure 2: Uniform fine 
 
(b) Fine depends on offence history 
The government does not know who the good and the bad drivers are. However it does know 
that there is a positive relationship between the number of previous convictions and the 
probability of an accident. Therefore, the drivers are divided into two groups: a group with no 
record and a group with a record. A driver gets a record if he caused an accident and/or if he 
is caught speeding. Both groups will consist of good and bad drivers. This is an important 
difference with the uniform case. Denote 
g
nr Π  as the proportion of good drivers without a 
record, 
g
r Π  the proportion of good drivers with a record, 
b
nr Π  the proportion of bad drivers 
without a record and 
b
r Π  the proportion of bad drivers with a record. Note that  1
gg
nr r ΠΠ +=  
and  1
bb
nr r ΠΠ += . We calculate these proportions in equilibrium using Markov chains later in 
this paper.  
The government then sets a fine  (,) x k ϕ , which depends firstly on the level of speed x and 
secondly on the history k  of the driver. 
private x  
x 
€ 
'( ) Cx  
(, ) x p xgh −  
(,) x p xbh −  
* s  
'( ) x δϕ −  
a
b x  
*
b x   *
















(,)  (9) 
where k  equals 0 if the driver has no criminal record and equals 1 if the driver has a criminal 
record.  
We assume that the government set fines in the following way. If the driver has no record, 
the regulator assumes that he is a good driver and equates the private costs with the social 











() (,) () (,)
(, ) (,)
 (10) 












() (,) () (,)
(,) (,)
 (11) 
We do not assume that the regulator sets the fines socially optimal. Comparing (11), (10) 
and (6) yields immediately that  1 0 x xx ϕ ϕϕ °≥ ≥ °
* (,) () (,) . How will this structure influence 
the speed choice of the drivers and hence the welfare losses? People again choose whether to 
speed or not. If they choose not to speed, they drive at the speed limit since  *
private sx <  and 
they will not pay a fine. Remember that bad drivers can speed unintentionally with probability 
q. If they do speed
14, they pay a fine, which depends on their criminal record. There are four 
cases we need to consider: good drivers with and without a record and bad drivers with and 
without a record. We first discuss, with the help of Figure 3, the case for drivers without a 
record and then turn, using Figure 4, to the case where drivers have a record. Both figures 
have the same structure as Figure 1. For  * x s ≤ ,  (,) x k ϕ  equals zero and coincides with the 
horizontal axis. For  * x s > , 0 x ϕ(,) is given by the fat line in Figure 3 and coincides with the 
marginal accident cost for the good drivers.  1 (,) x ϕ  coincides with the marginal accident cost 
for the bad drivers and is represented by a fat line in Figure 4.  
 
1)  Good drivers with no record.  
When good drivers speed their problem is represented by 
 
0 0   (using (9)) m i n() (,) ' () (,)
'( ) ( , )
x x
x
Cx x C x x
Cx px g h
δϕδ ϕ +⇒ = −
⇒= −
 (12) 
                                                 
14 You cannot comply by accident.   
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Note that (12) is the same as (3) and that good drivers with no record speed ()
* * g x s >  and 
choose the socially optimal level of speed. Hence there are no welfare losses for this group. 
 
2)  Bad drivers with no record 
Bad drivers with no record face the same problem as in (12) and hence chose speed 
**
g b x x > . The welfare loss ( )
nr
b WL  of this equals the grey triangle. However, a proportion q of 
them will drive faster unintentionally. The additional welfare loss ( )
nra
b WL  of this subgroup is 
represented by the black trapezium. 
 
 
Figure 3: Differentiated fine for drivers without a record 
 
3)  Good drivers with a record 
When good drivers with a record speed, they minimize the following problem 
 
1 1  (using (10)) m i n () (,) ' () (,)
'( ) ( , )
x x
x
Cx x C x x
Cx px b h
δϕδ ϕ +⇒ = −
⇒= −
 (13) 
The solution to this problem is speed  *
b x  at which point the expected fine is zero. Hence they 
will drive faster than  *
b x , and choose to drive at the maximum speed limit. The welfare loss 
for this group ( )
r
g WL  equals the black triangle in Figure 4. 
 
4)  Bad drivers with a record 
Bad drivers with a previous record also face problem (13); hence they try to comply. A 
proportion  () 1 q −  of bad drivers drive at the maximum speed level and their welfare losses 
a
b x  
*
g x  
x  
€ 
'( ) Cx  
(, ) x p xgh −  
(,) x p xbh −  
* s  
*
b x  
private x  




b WL  are denoted by the grey triangle. The other q percent of bad drivers speed 
unintentionally and their welfare losses equal the grey triangle, ( )
r
b WL  and the small hatched 
trapezium, ( )
ra
b WL . 
 
 
Figure 4: Differentiated fine for drivers with a record 
 
 
Total welfare losses for a differentiated fine ( ) df WL then equal  
  ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 01 1
nr nr r r
gb g b
nr nra r r ra
g df b b b b qq WL WL WL WL WL WL γγ γ γ ++ =Π + Π − +Π + − Π  (14) 
 
(c) Comparison of welfare losses. 
Which structure of fines should the regulator choose? He should compare the welfare losses 
under a uniform fine, given by (8) with the losses under a differentiated fine, given by (14). 
The differentiated fine is better if the welfare losses are lower than under a uniform fine, this 
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'( ) Cx  
(, ) x p xgh −  
(,) x p xbh −  
* s  
*
b x   *
g x  
private x  
 
1 (,) x x δϕ −  
a
b x   
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We cannot say that one structure will always dominate the other. In order to be able to 
compare the welfare losses, we have to calculate 
i
r
θ Π and 
i
nr
θ Π . If for example 
nr
b Π is very 
low and 
nr
g Π is very high, this is that the past violations are a good predictor of the drivers’ 
type, it is more likely that (15) will hold. We can calculate 
i
r
θ Π and 
i
nr
θ Π  in equilibrium if we 
know the movements from the drivers in and out the two groups. We argue that good drivers 
with no records will speed and moved to the ‘record group’ for two reasons: they are caught 
with probability δ  or they cause an accident with probability  ( )
*
g p x, g. Good drivers with a 
record will comply and move with an exogenous probability u  back to the ‘no record group’ 
if they do not have an accident. This reflects the fact that, if the driver is not caught and he did 
not cause an accident, after a period of time his record is cleared. Bad drivers with no record 
will also speed and have the same probability δ  of being caught and transferred to the ‘record 
group’. The probability that they have an accident,  ( ) ( )
**
gg p x, b px, g >  is higher. Hence the 
probability that a ‘bad driver without a record’ receives a record is higher than the probability 
that a ‘good driver without a record’ moves to the ‘record group’. If bad drivers have a record, 
they will try to comply. However with probability q they will speed unintentionally and with 
probability δ  they are caught. Moreover, they will also stay in the ‘record group’ if they have 
an accident. Hence their probability of moving to the ‘no record group’ is lowered to 
( )
* uq p s , b δ −− . We summarise these movements in the transition matrices represented in 
Table 1. 
Table 1 : Transition matrices 
 
Good drivers  Bad drivers 





g p x, g δ −−   ()
*




g p x, b δ −−   ( )
*
g p x, b δ +  
Record  () up s * , g −   ( ) 1
* up s , g −+ Record ( )
* uq p s , b δ −− ( ) 1
* uq p s , b δ −+ +
 
The long run equilibrium, or steady state, probability  j Π  may be found
15 by solving the 
following set of linear equations: (with  kj t the kj th element of the transition matrix)  
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g b ΠΠ >  and 
rr
g b ΠΠ < , so proportional to the population, it is most likely that 
there are more good drivers than bad drivers in the ‘no record group’ and that there are more 
bad than good drivers in the ‘record group’.  
The best structure is the one with the lowest welfare losses. Hence we prefer a uniform fine 
if  ud f WL WL <  and vice versa. At a first sight it is impossible to see which structure will 
perform the best. It depends mainly on the level of 
i
nr r
i θ θ γ Π Π , , . However, for one, although 
unrealistic, case the situation is clear-cut. If  1 qu δ = == , then  12
nr r
gg / ΠΠ == and 
01
nr r
bb , ΠΠ == . This is, the bad group coincides perfectly with the record group and the 
good drivers are evenly distributed into the two groups. In this case, the differentiated fine 
outperforms the uniform fine for any γ . The welfare losses for the bad drivers are the same 
under both fine systems, but under the differentiated fine, half of the good drivers will drive at 
their socially optimal speed.  
In reality,  q δ,  and u  will not take such extreme values. Which structure performs best, 
switches for a certain values for  q δ,  and u . This is shown in the illustration, which is 
discussed in the next paragraph.  
 
3  NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
We apply this model to interurban roads since unilateral accidents between cars and 
cyclists are most likely on this type of roads. The current speed limit in Belgium on interurban 
roads is either 70 or 90 km/h. We first calculate the private and socially optimal level of speed 
and the optimal uniform speed limit. We then compute the fines and compare them with the 
current fine structure. We end this section by determining the welfare losses to determine 
which fine structure performs best. The private cost for a driver is assumed to equal the sum  
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of the resource costs, the time costs and the fuel costs. The resource cost consists of the 
purchase cost, the insurance cost, maintenance,… We assume that this cost is independent of 
speed and equals 0.2355 €/km (De Borger and Proost 1997). The fuel cost depends on the fuel 
type, the price and the consumption. All elements needed to calculate the fuel costs are 
represented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 : Fuel costs 
Fuel type  Fuel price (€/l)  Consumption (l/km)  % share 
Diesel 0.811  2 0 13778 0 00242 0 000016 .. x . x −+   40.6 
Gasoline 1.068  0 0396 0 00064 .. x +   59.4 
Ministry of Economic Affairs (2001), MEET project (1998), IEA (2002), Ministry of Traffic and Infrastructure 
(2000) 
 
The time cost equals the value of time divided by the level of speed. For the value of time, 
we make a weighted average of the value of time of commuters, business and others. We 
obtain a value of time of 6.3917 €/h
16. The sum of the resource cost, the weighted fuel cost 
and the time cost make that we can express the private costs as  
 
35 2 6 3917
0 30599 0 3919 10 0 536 10 Cx x x
x
−− =+ ⋅ + ⋅
.
() . - . .  (18) 
The private optimum for drivers then equals (min C(x)) 98 km/h 
In order to derive the expected accident cost  ( ) ( ) i p x, h θ  we first consider the present 
accident risk  ( ) () accrisk a , given a current speed of 80 km/h
17, and correct this for changes in 
speed
18. We then multiply this risk with the value for the harm done (h(a)). We focus on 
accidents with slightly injured, heavy injured and deaths. Hence we do not take into account 
accidents with only material damage. The expected accident costs for a good driver can then 












(, ) () * ()  (19) 
with m(slight injury)=2, m(heavy injured=3), m(fatal)=4 
 
                                                 
16 Own calculation based on Gunn ea (1997) and Huber and Toint (2002). 
17 We assume that the speed limit equals 90 km/h on half of the interurban roads and 70 km/h on the other half.  
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We assume that the accident risk for bad drivers is 1.59 times the accident costs for good 
drivers, this is,  1 59 (,) . (, ) p xbh pxgh =  (Stradling ea (2000)). Table 3 gives the current 
accident risk and the cost of an accident.  
 
Table 3 : Accident risk and accident cost. 
Accident type  Cost accident (€)  Accident risk 
Light     26.273  7.92*10
-7 
Serious 965.131  1.27*10
-7 
Fatal 2.197.540  0.25*10
-7 
Own calculations based on De Brabander (2005), NIS(2005) 
 
Taking these accident costs into account yields the socially optimal speeds of  71 g x =
*  km/h 
and 64 b x =
*  km/h.  
Given this information and assuming that 20% of the population are bad drivers we first 
calculate the socially optimal uniform speed limit and find that  68 s = *  km/h
19. Next we 
calculate the uniform and the differentiated fines for each speed faster than the speed limit, 
assuming a probability of detection of 0.9% per trip and an average trip of 13 km. In order to 
compare these with the speed fine structure in Belgium we average these fines over the same 
classes as the current structure. Table 4 shows the results. 
 
Table 4 : Comparison with the existing structure 
 Present  structure  Results 
Speeding Average  immediate 
collection (€) 
Uniform fine (€)  Differentiated fine (€) 
      Fine no record   Fine if record 
< 10 km/h  50  50  44  71 
10-40 km/h  128  89  79  125 
+ 40 km/h  court  255  226  360 
Source: wegcode.be, KB 30 September 2005, own calculations. 
 
If we assume
20 a probability of detection of 0.9%, the calculated fines for small offences 
equal the existing ones. For larger offences, the current fines increase more steeply in the 
level of violation than the calculated fines.   
 
                                                 
19 Note that if no one speeds by accident,  0 q = , the optimal speed limit would equal 69 km/h. 
20 There is no data available for Belgium on what the actual probability could be.   
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In order to compare these two fining systems, we need to calculate the welfare losses. We 
let the probability of detection, δ  free. We first assume that 80 % of the drivers are good 
drivers ( 08 γ = . ), that the probability that bad drivers speed unintentionally equal 40% 
( 04 q = . ) and that the probability to return to the ‘no record group’ equals 30% ( 03 u = . ). 
The last figure means, for example, that you move to the ‘record group’ after three years if 
you were not caught or did not have an accident during these three years. Given this 
information we calculated 
ii
rn r , θ θ ΠΠ and the difference in social welfare,  WFL ∆ (welfare 
losses uniform fine minus welfare losses differentiated fine). The result is given in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 : Difference in welfare losses if  qu γ = == 08 04 03 ., ., .  
 
We see that for  01 6 . δ <  the differentiated fine performs better than the uniform fine. If 
01 6 . δ >  the uniform fine performs better. It is hard to know the real probability of detection 
in Belgium, but it will most likely be lower than 16% per trip
21. In this case we should prefer 
a differentiated fine. The optimal structure switches for a certain probability of detection. If δ  
increases, the uniform fine performs better. The reason for this is that if the probability of 
detection increases, the proportion of good drivers with a record also rises. Moreover, the 
probability of clearing the record is only  03 u. = . Hence, once a good driver has a record it 
keeps that record for a long time. If on the other hand the probability of clearing the record 
rises to 60 per cent () 06 u. = , the differentiated fine performs better as long as the probability 
of detection is lower than 0.36. Hence, for a given q, the probability of detection under which 
the differentiated fine performs better increases in the probability of clearing the record. If 
                                                 
21 We can obtain such a high probability of detection for certain areas by the use of automated speed control. 
However, it would be infeasible to obtain on a large area such as Belgium as a whole.  
δ  
WFL ∆   
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08 1 1 qu γ == = ., , , the differentiated fine always outperforms the uniform fine. We see 
this in Figure 6. The main reason for this is that with  1 q = , all bad drivers unintentionally 
speed and the probability that they belong to the ‘record group’ increases.  
 
Figure 6 : Difference in welfare losses if  08 1 1 ., q , u γ = ==  
 
This numerical example shows that for reasonable probabilities of detection, the differentiated 
fine should be preferred
22. Only if no bad driver speeds unintentionally ( ) 0 q =  and the 
probability to return to the ‘no record group’ is very low ( ) 01 u. = , the uniform fine is always 
preferred. The reason for this is that in this case the correlation between the type and having a 
record or not is not very good. Having a record is not a good signal anymore for the drivers’ 
type.  
 
4  CONCLUSION 
When one analyses fine structures for speed offences, one often finds two characteristics. 
Firstly, the level of the fine is increasing in the severity of the violation. Secondly, fines 
increase with the offence history. The first result is common in the standard literature. For the 
second result, there is much more controversy. Increasing fines in the offence history are 
often found in the real world, but are still a theoretical puzzle.  
                                                 
22 If  01 06 q. , u. ==  we prefer the differentiated fine if  02 . δ < . Even if no bad driver speeds by accident, If 
00 3 q, u. == we prefer the differentiated fine if  00 8 . δ < . 
WFL ∆  
δ   
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We focus on the structure of the fines and on repeated offences. We confront two fine 
systems: a uniform fine and a fine dependent on the offence history. Our rationale for having 
offence dependent fines is the following. People differ in their ability to follow the rules and 
in their propensity to cause an accident. This is, there are good and bad drivers and bad 
drivers can speed unintentionally even if they want to comply. Moreover, the expected 
accident cost for bad drivers is higher than for good drivers. Standard theory then prescribes 
that bad drivers should be fined more severely than good drivers. However, the government 
does not know who is a good and who is a bad driver. The literature shows that there is a 
relationship between the probability of being involved in an accident and the number of 
previous offences.  
We do not look for the optimal structure, but merely compare two systems. A uniform fine 
makes that good drivers are fined too harshly and bad drivers not enough. However, the 
differentiated fine system also does not work perfectly because there is no perfect correlation 
between the type and the group. There are bad drivers in the ‘no record group’ and good 
drivers in the ‘record group’. The choice between these two systems depends on how good the 
relationship between the type of the driver and the record of the driver is.  
We make a numerical illustration, which looks at two things. First, we calculate the optimal 
values for the speeding fines and compare these with the existing fines in Belgium. We find 
that the current fine structure increases faster than our calculated fines. We also find that for 
the current fines to be optimal, the probability of detection should be around 0.9% per trip. 
Further, we also study the critical values for the probability of detection, which determine the 
choice between the two fine structures. The analysis shows that for reasonable values for the 
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